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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The problems arising under section 18 have been limited considerably in its
short history. But the few areas in which issues arise still are the same areas in
which the policy choice of the judiciary is most critical. The division between the
majority and dissent in Shupack represents an accurate measure of the two phil-
osophies which the practitioner must recognize in choosing his course of drafts-
manship, whether it be in a comparable estate problem or in one entirely different.
The policy choice of the courts in interpreting section 18 must be flexible and
free to progress with the sociological and economic development of the people.
Whether any policy change is forthcoming remains to be seen27 but every indi-
cation would seem to point toward it.
Richard G. Birmingham
STATUTORY INNOVATION IN THE OBSCENITY FIELD
One of the most active areas in the field of constitutional law at the pres-
ent time is concerned with legislative attempts at raising the nation's moral
standards or, perhaps, preventing the lowering of the present standards' through
the suppression of books which are considered to be a bad influence on the read-
ing public. The cause of the present interest is undoubtedly the presence upon
the scene of the "horror comic" age and the "paper bound book" era.2 In attempt-
ing to suppress the objectionable matter, the New York courts have had resort
to section 1141 of the Penal Law.3 However the threat of fines and imprison-
ment did not result in the removal of the offending books from the stands and
27. In re Clark's Estate supra note 8; This case has been appealed to the
New York Court of Appeals where the disposition of the contentions may pro-
vide some indication of policy change in keeping with the rationale of Shupack.
If the Shupack case is followed, both the Clark and the S3chrauth supra note
12) cases would seem to be overruled.
1. H. R. REP. No. 2510, 82d Cong. 2d Sess. (1952).
2. AMERICAN BOOK PUBLISHERS' COUNCIL, BULLETIN No. 377. See Bok, Cen-
sorship and the Arts, in CIVIL LIBERTIES UNDER ATTACK, 117-120 (1951). Activity
in this field has not been restricted to the legislatures. Many private groups have
entered the censorship scene using persuasion and boycott as their weapons. DRIVE
FOR DECENCY IN PRINT, REPORT OF BISHOPS' COMMITTEE SPONSORING THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION FOR DECENT LITERATURE (1939). For an interesting discussion and
cricital analysis of the methods and effectiveness of the National Association for
Decent Literature see Harper's, Oct. 1956, p. 14-20 and the answer found in
America, Nov. 3, 1956, p. 120-123.
3. This section attempts to bring within its scope all forms of dissemination
through which obscene matter might get to a susceptible public. It deals with
the sale, loan, gift, distribution, showing or transmitting of any "obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting book, magazine, pamphlet, newspaper,
story paper, writing, paper, phonographic record, picture, drawing, photograph,
motion picture film, figure, image, phonograph record or wire or tape recording,
or any written, printed or recorded matter of an indecent character which may
or may not require mechanical or other means to be transmitted into auditory,
visual or sensory representations of such character."
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the legislature determined to find a more satisfactory solution to the problem 4-
a solution which would not run afoul of the First Amendment's guarantees of
free speech and free press.5
Realizing that enjoining distribution of a book would be the most effective
means of suppression, the legislature added section 22(a) to the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure." This section provides for a civil injunctive proceeding which,
in effect, tries the book for obscenity and if it is found guilty, the seller is com-
pelled to surrender all his copies to the sheriff, who is directed to destroy them.
SECTION 22(a): AN APPRAISAL
Section 22(a) is dearly drawn; 7 it avoids the problem of the overcritical
administrative official endowed with the sole right of determining whether a
book is obscene-it provides that the question of obscenity is to be decided by
a judge with a full right of appellate review on the facts and on the law; it im-
poses no restraint on that which is to be written or published in the future; it
makes no attempt at entering the field of politics" and deals solely with matter
which is obscene; it is closely patterned after section 1141 of the Penal Law and
it is considered (or intended) that a publication subject to injunction under
section 22(a) must be of the same character as would be subject to punishment
under the criminal section, which has been held valid.
Before entering upon a discussion of the grave constitutional problems in-
volved in any form of censorship and more particularly on the New York inno-
vation, a comment on the similarity of section 1141 and section 22(a) is felt
4. REPORT OF NEW YORK STATE JOINT LEGISLATIVE C01MrITTEE TO STUDY THE
PUBLICATION OF CoMIcs, No. 37, p. 32 (1954). The Committee felt that section
1141 was not sufficient and that a susceptible reading public remained contamin-
ated with pornographic filth and that some way had to be found to keep such
material from an impressionable public.
5. Liberty of speech and the press which the First Amendment guarantees
against abridgment by the Federal government is within the liberty safeguarded
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth from invasion by state action. Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925).
6. Section 22(a) gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction to enjoin the sale
or distribution of obscene prints and articles. The chief executive officer of the
community initiates the proceedings. The section includes books "herein described
or described in section eleven hundred forty-one of the Penal Law." Section 22(a)
(5) provides that "Every person, firm or corporation who sells, distributes or ac-
quires possession with intent to sell .or distribute any of the matter described In
paragraph one hereof, after the service upon him of a summons and complaint
in hn action brought . . . pursuant to the section Is chargeable with knowledge
of the contents thereof." Query as to the scope or constitutionality of this sub-
division.
7. Brown v. Kingsley Books, 1 N. Y. 2d 179, 186, 134 N. E. 2d 461, (1956).
8. It was this feature which was fatal to the statute involved In Nvear v.
Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 712 (1931). -
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necessary. Though the New York Court of Appeals in Brown v. Kingsley Books9
said that the book under fire in a civil action had to be of the same character as
would be subject to criminal prosecution, in fact, the determination in each
case will be quite different. In the civil action, the book's obscenity need be shown
only by a preponderance of the evidence, while in a criminal action, it must be
shown beyond a reasonable doubt. At least the quantum, if not the type, of evi-
dence will be different in each case. In the criminal action there is also a deter-
mination of the obscenity by a juryO which, in theory at least, insures against
arbitrary action by one man whose ideas of obscenity may be above or below
those of the general community in which the book is being sold.-" In the civil
action there is no provision for a jury determination of the question of obscenity.
The determination is made by a judge whose decision is appealable to another
body of judges but never does the average citizen receive an opportunity to ex-
press his views on the matter.
THE SCOPE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S PROTECTION
The First Amendment was drafted with memories of England's licensors
still fresh in the minds of the colonists.12 It cannot be denied that the principal
reason for the inclusion of the First Amendment in the Bill of Rights was to
9. 1 N. Y. 2d 179, 134 N. E. 2d 461 (1956). On appeal to the Supreme Court
the Brown case has been combined with two other recent decisions dealing with
the question of obscenity. In the Brown case the question certified is: Does the
New York statute (section 22(a) ) impose a prior restraint upon publication in
violation of the First Amendment. Alberts v. California, 138 Cal. App. 2d Supp.
909, 292 P. 2d 90 (1956), dealt with a statute which made it unlawful to keep
for sale or advertisement obscene or indecent books. The California courts de-
clared that the statute was not unduly vague and that the bookseller's use of the
U. S. mails to advertise obscene books does not render the state statute inopera-
tive. The questions certified: Is the California statute void for vagueness? Does
it place an unconstitutional limitation on free speech? Does the Federal power
over the mails preclude application of the statute to the mailing of circulars and
the keeping of books for sale by mail. The third case, U. S. v. Both, 237 F. 2d
796 (2d Cir. 1957), is concerned with the Federal obscenity statute, 18 U. S. C.
§1461, proscribing the mailing of obscene matter. The certified questions are:
Does the statute violate the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First
Amendment? Does it violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment?
Does it violate the First, Ninth and Tenth Amendments in that it improperly in-
vades powers reserved to the states and to the people.
10. However, since the criminal prosecution based on section 1141 involves
only a misdemeanor, a defendant is not entitled to a trial by jury as a matter of
right. N. Y. CONsT. art. VI, §18 (1894); see People v. Kaminsky, 208 N. Y. 389,
394, 102 N. E. 515, 516 (1913). However, it is the practice, under section 1141, to
give the defendant a jury trial. See People v. Muller, 96 N. Y. 408, 48 Am. Rep.
635 (1884); People v. Pesky, 254 N. Y. 373, 173 N. E. 227 (1930); People v. Eagle,
203 Misc. 598, 117 N. Y. S. 2d 380 (Mag. Ct. 1952); People v. Goldman, 197 Misc.
290, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 535 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
11. Whether an object is obscene involves a question of community stand-
ards-a question which a jury composed of citizens drawn from all walks of life
should resolve. People v. Goldman, 197 Misc. 209, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 535 (Sup. Ct.
1950).
12. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U, S. 444 (1937); Grosjean v. American Press Go.,
297 U. S. 233 (1936).
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prevent any such licensing in America.' 3 But it must not be concluded that this
was the sole reason' 4 and that therefore any and all subsequent restraints which
were imposed subsequent to publication were to be tolerated. 1 It was deemed
that the very survival of this nation was dependent on each citizen being able to
think freely and speak with restraints on this right being tolerated only to the
extent necessary to prevent breaches of the peace.16 A freedom to think, speak
or publish which ceased on utterance would, in reality, be no freedom at all since
the restraint or punishment might prevent the utterance from being made origin-
ally.17 However, the problem of the breadth of the First Amendment freedoms
has not been solved.
A NEw MODE OF CENSORSHIP
Section 22(a) was an important step forward for the advocates of censor-
ship. It did not provide for the traditional type of restraint-the licensor who
must approve the book before it can be published'S-an obvious violation of
the First Amendment guarantees; nor did it impose a criminal punishment sub-
sequent to publication, which, though it punished the seller or distributor, left
the book in circulation. Generally, the subsequent punishment statutes have been
upheld, either because they are not felt to provide sufficiently grave deterrents to
the exercises of the First Amendment freedoms, or because it was not felt that
the imposition of punishment subsequent to publication was prohibited by the
First Amendment.'0
13. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454 (1907); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S.
697 (1931).
14. The Supreme Court in the Near case specifically pointed to the defini-
tion of freedom of speech and press as given by Blackstone: "The liberty of the
press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists In laying
no previous restraints upon publication, and not in freedom from censure for
criminal matter when published. Every freeman has undoubted right to lay
what sentiments he pleases before the public, to forbid this is to destroy the
freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or Illegal,
he must take the consequences of his own temerity." 4 BI. Com. 151, 152 (1765).
The Court stated that this was not, however, the American concept but that
something more was encompassed by the First Amendment. Near v. Minnesota,
283 U. S. 697, 714-715 (1931).
15. See Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
648, 655 (1955). In Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 (1877) an ordinance could not
be saved because it related to distribution and not to publication. "Liberty of
circulation is as essential to that freedom as liberty of publishing; indeed without
circulation, publication would be of little value."
16. See Jefferson's Second Inaugural Address, March 4, 1815 wherein he
stated that any improprieties which could not be redressed by a libel suit must
look to the censorship of public opinion. See also ST. JOHN-STEVAs, OBSCENTY
AND THE LAW 191 (1956); DeJonge v .Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 365 (1937).
17. "Freedom of thought is worthless unless it goes with freedom of ex-
pression; thought is expression; an unexpressed thought, like an unlaid egg,
comes to nothing. Given this freedom, then, other freedoms will follow." KALLEN,
THE LIBERAL SPIRIT 133 (1948).
18. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931).
19. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 462 (1907); Commonwealth v.
Blanding, 3 Pick. 304, 313, 314 (1824).
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Section 22 (a) neither provides for a prohibited prior restraint (as the term
is generally construed), nor does it involve a subsequent punishment (the status
of which is not definitely established). It imposes a subsequent restraint. Is this
subsequent restraint violative of the First Amendment?
There would appear to be a simple way of upholding the Constitutionality
of the section. This is the solution proposed by Judge Desmond in his concurring
opinion in the Brown2" case. He suggests that obscene matter is not protected
by the First Amendment and therefore any statute which deals with this matter
is constitutional. In the case of Near v. Minnesota2x there was dicta to the effect
that even the restriction on prior restraints may be lifted when obscene matter
is involved. Obscene matter was classified with defamatory matter and matter
causing breaches of the peace as being beyond the scope of First Amendment
protection. This would seem to be a valid classification only if obscene matter is
likely to cause a breach of the peace (the falsity of this proposition will be dis-
cussed later) or if it can be said that lewd and obscene utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas and are of such slight social value that any benefit
that may be derived from them is outweighed by the social interests in order and
morality.22 This latter proposition would seem to be answered by the Supreme
Court in the Winters' 3 case (again, unfortunately, in dicta) that, though it may
be true, that there can be seen nothing of any social value in the publications in-
volved, they are entitled to the protection of a free press as much as the best of
literature. If speech and press are really free, what possible justification is there
for saying that a publication is not free or that certain speech is not protected
other than the previously mentioned danger to public order? It would seem that
there is no shorthand method of disposing of the problem raised by section 22 (a).
Is it possible to uphold the section as the majority in the Brown24 case did?
Apparently feeling that the section involved a prior restraint, but not a restraint
of sufficient seriousness as to invalidate the statute, the New York court held that
the section was not an unconstitutional prior restraint on publication prohibited
by the First Amendment. It seems a strange perversion of the term prior restraint
to denominate something a prior restraint which clearly becomes effective only
subsequent to publication. Traditionally it has been confined to restraints imposed
20. Brown v. Kingsley Books, I N. Y. 2d 179, 188, 143 N. E. 2d 461, 468
(1956).
21. 283 U. S. 697 (1931). Chief Justice Hughes stated that the doctrine of
prior restraints would not be applied in exceptional instances. As examples of
these instances he gave wartime, acts of violence and overthrow of the govern-
ment and obscenity: "On similar grounds, the primary requirements of decency
may be enforced against obscene publications." He cited no authorities for this
proposition. Similar dicta may be found in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U. S. 568, 572 (1942) and Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495 (1952).
22. Chaplinsky v. Vew Hampshire, supra note 21 at 572.
23. Winters v Lew York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948).
24. Brown v. Kingsley Books, 1 N. Y. 2d 179, 134 N. E, 2d 461 (1956).
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prior to publication.2 Can it now be said to embrace any restraint which occurs
prior to the book's distribution to all who might wish to read it?26 This indeed
would be a strained interpretation and one which would most likely only find
use where there is an attempt to fit a new restriction into an old familiar mold to
facilitate its disposition. If the term is to have any meaning at all it should be
confined to censorship which occurs prior to publication.21 Section 22(a), a sub-
sequent restraint, cannot be upheld as a "not so serious" prior restraint.
Can it be upheld, as a subsequent punishment statute is upheld, as being
beyond the protection of the First Amendment? It is clear that any act which
effectively puts a book out of the channels of distribution through which it reaches
the reading public raises serious constitutional problems regardless of the name tag
whi4js put on it. It cannot categorically be said that because the restraint involved
is subsequent to publication it is without constitutional protection. The First
Amendment embraces some subsequent punishments-depending on the nature
of the act involved.28 Section 22(a) cannot be upheld simply by saying it deals
with a book only after publication and therefore, presents no constitutional prob-
lems.
It would also seem that there "can be no justification of the section by saying
that it does no more nor goes no further than a similarly worded criminal statute2
when present thought indicates that the day may be approaching when even the
criminal statute will have to defend its right to continue in existence.
CENSORSHIP AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
It is not asserted that the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment are abso-
lutes.30 These rights may be restricted under proper circumstances, as may any
constitutionally given right. The problem is thus not of whether freedom of speech
25. See Poulos v. New Haonpshire, 345 U. S. 395 (1953); Kunz v. New York,
340 U. S. 290 (1950); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1941).
26. There has been much criticism of the formalistic prior restraint-sub-
sequent punishment idea. See Previous Restraints Upon Freedom of Speech, 31
COLUM. L. REV. 1148 (1931); Note, Prior Restraint-A Test of Invalidity in Free
Speech Cases?, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1949); Freund, The Supreme Court
and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND L. REV. 533, 544 (1951). A thorough analysis of the
entire prior restraints problem can be found in Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior
Restraints, 20 LAW & CONTEMPT. PROBLEMS 648 (1955).
27. "I am of the considered opinion that when the court-after an adversary
hearing-is able to read and examine the publication objected to, and acts
judicially to enjoin their distribution, it is apparent that there is no previous
restraint in the genuine historical and constitutional sense of that term." Judge
Matthew M. Levy in Burke v. Kingsley Books, 203 Misc. 150, 162, 142 N. Y. S.
2d 735, 747 (Sup Ct. 1956).
28. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 715 (1931).
29. Brown v. Kingsley Books, 1 N. Y. 2d 179, 186, 134 N. E. 2d 461, 466
(1956).
30. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571-2 (1942).
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and press may be abridged, but rather of when and how. It is only when the speech
or publication provokes activity inimical to the public welfare that the right may
be abridged and it is only when the danger to the state is sufficiently grave and
proper safeguards are provided. When a statute attempts to restrain speech or pub-
lication it must justify its action as a valid exercise of the police power.31 The
state, as in the usual police power cases, makes the initial determination that an
evil exists. The means selected to eliminate the evil must be reasonably necessary
and appropriate to attain the desired end.32 When the means selected involves the
imposition of criminal sanctions, the statute must satisfy due process requirements
and not be unduly vague.
33
In addition to satisfying the general requirements for the validity of a police
measure, when the measure chosen to eliminate the evil involves a restraint on a
First Amendment freedom, which freedoms are at the very basis of our society, ad-
ditional requirements must be met. Speech can only be prohibited when the re-
quirements of the "clear and: probable danger" test are met.34 It might be added,
at this point, that the cases which have involved freedom of the press have not
used the "dear and probable danger" approach.35 There appears to be no reason
why these two fundamental freedoms should receive different treatment in this
area when they are treated together, under the heading of freedom of expression,
in all other instances. The test should apply to both and it seems only a question
of time before the Supreme Court gives sanction to this.36 It might also be noted
that when First Amendment freedoms are involved, a statute restricting them does
not carry with it the usual presumption of constitutionality which a similarly en-
acted economic regulation possesses
3
31. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931).
32. Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N. Y. 288, 150 N. E. 120 (1925); Defiance Milk
Products Co. v. DuMond, 309 N. Y. 537, 132 N. E. 2d 829 (1956).
33. If a statute includes the prohibition of some acts which are fairly within
the protection of a free press, it is void. Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948)
in which a part of section 1141 of the New York Penal Law was held uncon-
stitutionally vague.
34. Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 (1951). See Hyman, Judicial
Standards for the Protection of Basic Freedoms, 1 BuFFALo L. REV. 221 (1952).
35. However, see Roth v. Goldman, 172 F. 2d 788, (2d Cir. 1949) (concurring
opinion) in which Judge Frank presents a thought provoking analysis of the
entire obscenity problem.
36. The Pennsylvania courts appear to have accepted the rationale urged
by Judge Bok in Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. Dist. & Co. R. 101 (1949),
that the clear and present danger test must be met in this area. Commonwealth
v. Figenbaum et al., 166 Pa. Sup. Ct. 120 (1950). "The right of expression beyond
the conventions of the day is the very basis of a free society." Justice Frank-
furter concurring in Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U. S. 146, 156, 160 (1946).
(Emphasis added).
37. United States v. Carolene, 304 U. S. 144, 152 (1938). The "Preferred
Rights Doctrine" which gives a priority to the First Amendment freedoms has
been propounded in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1946); Schneider v. State,
308 U. S. 147 (1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1941).
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THE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER To CURB IMMORAL Acts
When a legislature determines that immoral acts are sufficiently detrimental
to the public welfare to be prohibited, the means chosen to curb the objectionable
conduct must be reasonably necessary and appropriate to achieve that end. Legisla-
tures have selected various means of eliminating this evil-laws prohibiting pros-
titution, white slavery, and so on-but the means selected with which we are here
concerned is a restriction on the literature which the public may read. To satisfy
the mimimal requirements to which every police power measure is subjected, it
must be shown that a restriction on the publication is reasonably necessary and
appropriate to attain the desired goal. It would seem that at this initial test, a pub-
lication restriction runs afoul of the Constitution since there is no reasonably con-
clusive evidence either that the reading or viewing of books causes the acts or that
a restriction on the publication of books will lessen the commission of immoral
acts.35
But should this stumbling block be disregarded, the"clear and probable dan-
ger" test must still be met. There must be a clear danger that the expression in-
volved will cause a substantive evil which the legislature has the right to prevent.
The danger must be serious and probable. These factors must be weighed against
the value of the speech involved.3 9
GOVERNMENTAL RESTRICTIONS ON ACmS
To satisfy the "dear and probable danger" test the speech involved must cause
an act which the legislature can proscribe. This fact seem to be forgotten by the
courts4" and legislatures4' when they deal with obscenity matters. One of the basic
principles of our society is that the government functions by controlling the acts
-not thoughts-of its members. A restriction is placed on man's activities, not
his thoughts. Man is punished for what he does, not for what he thinks. It is the
38. See Alpert, Censorship and the Press, 52 HARV. L. REV. 40, 72 (1938);
Both v. Goldman, 172 F. 2d 788, 796 (2d Cir. 1949). (Concurring opinion.); Jahoda,
THE ImPACT OF LITERATURE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL DISCUSSION OF SoasE ASSUmPTIONS
IN THE CENSORSHIP DEBATE (1954); Feder, Comic BooK REGULATION (UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AmINISTRATION, 1955 LEGISLATIVE PROBLEIS No.
2). Contra, WERTHAM, SEDUCTION OF THE INNOCENT (1954).
39. Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 (1951).
40. The test of obscenity which is generally accepted by the New York
courts is that set forth in People v. Berg, 241 App. Div. 543, 272 N. Y. S. 586 (2d
DelYt 1934)-an obscene book is one that tends to corrupt the morals of youth
or to lower the standards of right and wrong specifically as to sexual relations.
To be deemed obscene the book must show sexual impurity and result in the ex-
citing of lustful and lecherous thoughts and desires or tend to stir sexual im-
pulses or to lead to sexually impure thoughts. In People v. Muller, 96 N. Y. 408
(1884) the test was whether it was calculated to excite impure imaginations.
41. See GA. CODE ANN. §26-6301a (1953). Obscenity is defined as "any
literature offensive to chastity or modesty, expressing or presenting to the mind
or view something that purity and decency forbids to be exposed."
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function of law in any democratic society to maintain general public order by
providing those restraints necessary to maintain order. It acts necessarily as a nega-
tive force preventing evil rather than as a positive force designed to foster good.
When an attempt is made to raise the moral standards of the people-to purify
man's thoughts, as it were--other organs must be looked to for leadership. There
are institutions, including the churches, homes and schools whose function it is
to deal with public morality. It is not to the law but to these institutions that re-
gard must be had if the desire to strengthen man's moral standards is to be ful-
filled.42 Therefore, it is not the function of the legislature to determine that read-
ing a certain piece of literature will tend to arouse sexual desires or thoughts and
that, therefore, the reading must be stopped. It is not thoughts or desires but only
acts with which the legislature may concern itself.43
Thus, under the Smith Act, Communists are not punished for what they
think, nor is the academic discussion of communism prohibited. Advocacy is pun-
ished because it has been determined that advocacy presents a clear and probable
danger of the doing of the acts. 44 When the serious consequences of acts of over-
throw are considered it is recognized that the danger need not be so near as to be
imminent before the speech involved, which is felt will cause the act, may be re-
stricted.
But in the area of immoral relations, the evils resulting, even if the expression
involved were transformed into acts, cannot compare, in gravity, with acts directed
at the government's overthrow and thus the probability that the speech, which is to
be restricted, will cause the act must be commensurately greater. The problem con-
sists in weighing the values involved. When the value of free speech is balanced
against the protection of the governmnent-the scales are almost evenly balanced.
4 5
It is a dose question as to which interest will have to be sacrificed and the extent
of the sacrifice. But when the interest of the government in eliminating illicit sex-
ual acts is weighed against the value of free speech, the scales balance heavily in
favor of the protection of expression and almost no limitation on the right of ex-
pression can be tolerated to protect this essentially secondary interest."6 Further-
more, as has been previously mentioned, there appear to be no accurate appraisals
42. See Murray, Literature and Censorship, Books on Trial, June-July 1956.
43. In a noted opinion by Judge Bok, in Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa.
Dist. & Co. R. 101 (1949), it was said that there must be "a reasonable and
demonstrable cause to believe that a crime or misdemeanor has been committed
or is about to be committed as the perceptible result of the publication." See also
the concurring opinion of Judge Frank in United States v. Roth, 237 F. 2d 796
(2d Cir. 1957) which is the most recent thorough survey in this area.
44. Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 (1951).
45. See note 44 supra.
46. The likelihood, however great, that a substantive evil will result can-
not alone justify a restriction on free speech or press. The evil itself must be
substantial. Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941). See Brandeis concurring
in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927).
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of the effect which a book may have on its readers or as to how many of those
guilty of committing immoral acts are aroused to such activity by reading books.
47
It would seem that in no sense can the requirements of the "dear and probable
danger" test be met by statutes which place restrictions on the distribution of
obscene matter. And thus section 22(a), as well as section 1141, appears to be
unconstitutional.
THE VAGUENESS OF THE TERM "OBSCENE"
Even if one assumes that these insurmountable burdens could be met by the
state-that the necessary causal links and requisite importance of the interest to be
protected were present-the problem of how to describe, with sufficient definiteness,
the material to be banned must be met.48 It might appear academic to argue the
merits of the use of the term "obscene" in this area, since for many years courts
have easily disposed of objections to its use.49 It cannot be denied that the concept
of "obscenity" is, of necessity, vague since it is a moral determination which varies
with the times.50 But perhaps one can justify its use by applying to it the argu-
ment used to overrule objections to the use of the term "due process'-that in
any particular era it is discernible with sufficient definiteness to withstand any con-
stitutional challenge to its use. It is probably true that if one can describe this
matter at all, using the term "obscene" is probably as good as any. It is not felt
necessary to enter in and do battle with the problem of what is "obscene". Courts
47. See ,Lockhart and McClure, Obscenity in the Courts, 20 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 587, 594 (1955). For a more comprehensive view by the same
authors see Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the Con-
stitution, 38 MINN. L. RaV. 295 (1953). Censorship advocates frequently use the
theme that these statutes are necessary to protect children from matter tending
to corrupt their morals. A statute reflecting this view was recently struck down
as not reasonably restricted to the evil with which It is said to deal. Butler v.
Michigan -U. S.-, 77 S. Ct. 524 (1957). This reasoning may cause many
similar statutes to fall.
48. Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948).
49. The answer of the New York courts has been: (1) "obscenity" Is a
is a common law term with a well understood judicial meaning. Winters 'v. New
York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948). or (2) that while it is true that its bonds cannot be
definitely established, the use of the word "obscene" will be upheld If, In looking
at the whole book, the court finds that the book tends to lower the standards of
right and wrong, specifically as to sexual relations. People v. Wendling, 258 N. Y.
451, 180 N. E. 169 (1932); People v. Berg, 241 App. Div. 543, 272 N. Y. Supp. 586
(2d Dep't 1934), af'd, 269 N. Y. 514, 199 N. E. 513 (1935).
50. "Obscenity is a relative and subjective term describing the reaction of
the human mind to a certain type of experience. Obscenity resides not In the
thing contemplated but in the mind of the contemplating person." ST. JOHN-
STEVAS, OBSCENrTY AND THE LAV 1, (1956). "The fundamental reason that obscene
is not susceptible of exact definition is that such intangible moral concepts as It
purports to connote vary in meaning from one period to another." CAnDoZo,
PARADoxEs OF LEGAL SCIENCE 37 (1927).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
have varied their standards with some looking at the intent of the author 5' and
others looking at the effect on the reader; some look at passages of a book 52 while
others look at the effect of the entire book; 53 some look to the opinions of literary
critics5 4 and the place which the book has in the literary field " while others com-
pletely disregard this; 56 some feel that the effect of the book on the abnormal is to
be looked to57 while others feel that it is only the effect of the book on the normal
average man that must be considered; 58 someplace emphasis on the sincerity of
purpose of the author5 9-as seen through examination of the book or through ex-
ternal means. But regardless of the many problems involved in a determination
of a book's obscenity, it is probable that if a censorship statute is to be overturned,
it will not be on the grounds of vagueness.
CONCLUSION
If full effect is to be given to the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment, section 22 (a) as well as section 1141 must be held to be unconstitutional.
The rash of new statutes which are flooding the legislatures must cease. Obscene
matter is protected by the First Amendment-just as is the best of literature. There
appears to be a strong belief that that which is pornographic can be restricted with-
out regard to the First Amendment, distinguishing it from obscenity because it is
51. Recent theory is that the court will only look at the author's objective
intent which equates with the book's effect on others. United States v. Ulysses,
72 F. 2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934); Parmelee v. United States, 113 F. 2d 729 (D. C. Cir.
1940). An interesting recent development occurred in Walker v. D'Alessandro,
- Md. -, 129 A.2d 148 (1957). A libel action was brought against the mayor
of Baltimore, who had removed a painting from a municipal museum stating
that the artist had painted an obscene picture. In overruling defendant's demur-
rer, it was held that this could be an imputation on the character of the author
and the act was not protected by an absolute privilege since there was no
statute authorizing the mayor to so act. It would seem that if libel prosecutions
are to be allowed, the intent of the author will take on new importance. The
question of an author's intent was also considered to be of importance in an
action involving the Federal obscenity statute. Sunshine Book Co. v. Summer-
field, 221 F.2d 42 (D. C. Cir. 1956).
52. This was true in those courts which followed the classic test of Regina
v. Hicklin, 3 Q.B. 360, 371 (1868): "Whether the tendency of the matter charged
as obscene is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such im-
moral influence and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall." This
test was adopted in the United States in United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed Cas.
1093, No. 14,571 (S.D.N.Y. 1879); adopted by the New York Court of Appeals in
People v. Muller, 96 N. Y. 408 (1884) and generally accepted (though vigorously
denounced by Judge L. Hand in United States v. Kennerly, 209 F. 119 (D.
C.D.C. 1913) until the decision in United States v. Ulysses, 72 F. 2d 705 (2d
Cir. 1934).
53. Halsey v. New York Soc. for the Suppression of Vice, 234 N. Y. 1, 136
N.E. 219 (1922); United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936).
54. People v. Creative Age Press, 79 N.Y.S. 2d 198 (Mag. Ct. 1948).
55. United States v. Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
56. People v. Dial Press, 48 N.Y.S. 2d 480 (Mag. Ct. 1944).
57. Regina v. Hicklin, 3 Q.B. 360, 371 (1868).
58. Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. Dist. & Co.R 101 (1949).
59. United States v. Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934); People v. Vanguard
Press, 84 N.Y.S.2d 198 (Mag. Ct. 1948).
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deliberately designed to stimulate sex feelings and to act as an aphrodisiac whereas
an obscene book has no such immediate and dominant purpose, although inci-
dentally this may be its effect.60 This will not be considered since it is the purpose
of this writing to show that the present censorship statutes are unconstitutional.
It will have to remain to be determined whether a narrowly-drawn statute can
meet the "clear and probable danger" test.
June A. Murray
TEST FOR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of recovery under workmen's compensation statutes for occu-
pational diseases has been a thorny one since the inception of stautory liability in
this area. Originally recovery was denied in most instances under the theory that
such disablement was not the result of an accident, the latter being a pre-requisite
for liability.1 This result was somewhat tempered by equating diseases incurred as a
consequence of sudden or fortuitous occurrences or of a traumatic event to injur-
ies as a result of accidents. 2 However, even with this, a vast number of diseases
incidental to employment were left uncovered for it is settled that there can be
no recovery for disablement as a result of an occupational disease unless the work-
men's compensation law specifically so authorizes.3
With the passage of time, the various states enacted specific legislation in this
area4 until at the present time all but three states provide at least minimal
coverage.5 These statutes may be divided roughly into two categories: 0 those which
60. See JACKSON, THE FEAiz OF BOOKS 121-135 (1932); ST. JOHN-STEVAS,
OBSCENITY AND THE LAv 2 (1956). United States v. Ulysses, supra, note 59. It Is
this writer's view that if section 22(a) were drafted so as to describe only
"pornographic" matter (as was involved, concededly, in Brown v. Kingsley Books,
1 N. Y. 2d 177, 134 N. E. 2d 461 (1956)) the statute would be constitutional. See 6
BUFFALO L. REV. 155, 156, n.5, 157 (1957). This determination involves another
fact question-What is pornographic and what is not? However this will bring
an end to the prosecution of books which can be said to have any literary merit
or which were written for any legitimate purpose. It would also appear that
under such a statute, the intent of the author may take on added importance
although the subjective element could be handled, as it is at the present time,
by determining his intent as it may be gleaned from the book, Itself.
1. State ex rel. Cashman v. Sims, 130 W.Va. 430, 43 S.E.2d 805 (1947).
2. Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. Kerr, 203 Ky. 804, 263 S.W. 342 (1924); Renlkel
v. Industrial Commission, 109 Ohio St. 152, 141 N.E. 834 (1923).
3. Henry v. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co., 231 N.C. 477, 57 S.E.2d 760 (1950);
State ex rel. Cashman v. Sims, 130 W.Va. 430, 43 S.E.2d 805 (1947).
4. E.g., N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 3 (2).
5. Kansas, Mississippi and Wyoming do not provide for occupational disease
coverage.
6. Most of the statutes have other differences within the two major cat-
egories. See, e.g., COLORADO STAT. ANN. c. 97, §451 (c), (e) wherein special require-
ments for recovery for silicosis are provided.
